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I.

INTRODUCTION

On May 10, 2013, President Barack Obama announced the
National Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR).1 The document
describes foci of the policy, which include: (1) improving our
awareness of activities, conditions, and trends in the Arctic
region that may affect our safety, security, environmental, or
commercial interests;2 (2) protecting the Arctic environment
and conserving its resources;3 (3) establishing and
 Center for Resilient Communities, University of Idaho – funding through National
Science Foundation grants ARC 1355238 and OIA 1301792 is acknowledged; a partner
of the Arctic Domain Awareness Center, University of Alaska – funding through the
Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence program is acknowledged.
 Alaska Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research, University of
Alaska
† Aleut International Association
1. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC REGION (2013),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf [hereinafter
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC REGION].
2. Id. at 6.
3. Id.

1
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institutionalizing
an
integrated
Arctic
management
framework;4 (4) charting the Arctic region;5 and (5) employing
scientific research and traditional knowledge to increase
understanding of the Arctic.6 Two of the guiding principles in
accomplishing the strategy are: “decisions . . . based on the
most current science and traditional knowledge” and
engagement “in a consultation process with Alaska Natives
. . . .”7 NSAR also calls for improved international cooperation
and collaboration in the Arctic,8 a call that was echoed by
Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski in a recent forum on Arctic
issues held in Washington, D.C. on September 16.9
Shortly following the release of the NSAR, the United States
Coast Guard released its supporting strategy for the Arctic
region on 10 May 2013, aligned to its federally designated
missions that principally provide for safety and security.
USCG followed that strategy with a comprehensive
implementation plan in December 2015. Included in these
documents are the task to specifically address assistance
coordination and environmental response.
Strengthening U.S. efforts in support of the Arctic, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security chartered a new university
center of excellence, the Arctic Domain Awareness Center
(ADAC) in summer 2014. ADAC, which is hosted by the
University of Alaska, supports DHS, USCG and U.S. maritime
missions in the Arctic region by developing and transitioning
technology solutions, innovative products, and educational
programs and to improve situational awareness and crisis
response capabilities. A unique project within the center’s
efforts is research in support of community-based observation
for situational awareness. In a complimentary manner, the
University of Idaho’s Center for Community Resilience
provides
research
to
strengthen
community-based
preparedness and response.
Similarly, the United Nations’ Hyogo Framework (HFA) has
three strategic goals: to integrate disaster risk reduction into

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 9, 11.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 3.
Id. at i.
Senator Lisa Murkowski, Address at the Forum on Arctic Issues (Sept. 16, 2015).
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sustainable development policies and planning; to develop and
strengthen institutions, mechanisms and capacities to build
resilience to hazards; and to systematically incorporate risk
reduction approaches into the implementation of emergency
preparedness, response and recovery programs.10 To achieve
these goals, the HFA outlined five specific priorities for action:
(1) making disaster risk reduction a priority;11 (2) improving
risk information and early warning;12 (3) building a culture of
safety and resilience;13 (4) reducing the risks in key sectors;14
and (5) strengthening preparedness for response.15
There are multiple levels of efforts in the Arctic that can
contribute toward these policies. They include: (1) basic science
to understand the dynamics of Arctic change including its
dynamics within the circumpolar North, its connectivities to
other global regions, and the consequences to regional and
global livelihoods and well-being;16 (2) the politics of Alaska
(i.e., state and national), perhaps one of the most visible, yet
least pragmatic, components;17 and (3) the adaptation actions
which comprise the pragmatic responses on the ground.18
Adaptation actions bring together both science and politics but
despite the many research papers, databases, and roundtables
focusing on the Arctic, this area has received little attention.
Although considerable scientific monitoring has been
conducted in the Arctic, instrumented records of
environmental conditions in Alaska and in other Arctic regions
present their own set of problems. Ocean surface current
sensors, ocean buoy networks, and ocean subsurface glider
observations, as well as terrestrial gauges and meteorological
10. World Conference on Disaster Reduction, Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–
2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters, ¶ 12, U.N.
DOC. A/CONF.206/6 (Mar. 16, 2005).
11. Id. at 6.
12. Id. at 7.
13. Id. at 9.
14. Id. at 10.
15. Id. at 12.
16. See NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC REGION, supra note 1; U.S. DEP’T OF
DEF., 2014 CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION ROADMAP (2014), http://ppec.asme.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/10/CCARprint.pdf [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION
ROADMAP].
17. See Fran Ulmer, Alaska and the Arctic, 31 ALASKA L. REV. 161, 163–64 (2014).
18. See NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC, supra note 1; CLIMATE CHANGE
ADAPTATION ROADMAP, supra note 16.
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stations, are sparse and records often do not extend far back in
time, or records are kept for a limited time period and are then
discontinued.19 Additionally, the reliability and validity of
instrumented data in Alaska and Alaskan waters are
questionable for a variety of reasons.20 Sensors are placed in
populated areas and near shore locales; because the geographic
area of the Arctic is vast and the conditions are harsh, many
areas of the Arctic are not populated and therefore no sensors
exist.21 The need to deploy sensors lies in the criticality of
observing change: high frequency radars are used for
monitoring ocean surface currents in the Chukchi Sea; an
ocean buoy network provides continuous ocean acidification
monitoring in the Chukchi Sea, Bering Sea, and Gulf of
Alaska; the distributed biological observatory provides
biological, chemical, and physical monitoring for change
detection; and glider observations are used to establish a time
series of subsurface ocean conditions.22 The Alaska Ocean
Observing System (AOOS) is a regional data steward for many
of these observations and data and makes information
products available through its online data portal, including
community-based observing data for the Bering Sea.23 Most
recently, the new Arctic Information Fusion Capability (AIFC),
which operates out of the Arctic Domain Awareness Center
(ADAC), provides a means to organize and integrate diverse
data streams with machine learning so as to provide an
unprecedented knowledge system for decision support. Such
observations and systems are necessary to ensure that
appropriate responses are mounted to undesired changes,
opportunities are utilized, and security is sustained for
everything from food and water resources to incursions into
19. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOWARD AN INTEGRATED ARCTIC OBSERVING
NETWORK 85 (2006); ALASKA OCEAN OBSERVING SYSTEM, http://www.aoos.org (last
visited Mar. 6, 2016).
20. See Douglas L. Kane & Sveta L. Stuefer, Reflecting on the Status of Precipitation
Data Collection in Alaska: A Case Study, 46 HYDROLOGY RESEARCH 478 (2015);
Samuel Bauret & Svetlana L. Stuefer, Kenai Peninsula Precipitation and Air
Temperature Trend Analysis, 19TH INT’L NORTHERN RESEARCH BASINS SYMP. &
WORKSHOP 35 (2013).
21. Kane & Stuefer, supra note 20, at 478.
22. See ALASKA OCEAN OBSERVING SYSTEM, http://www.aoos.org (follow “Access
Data” hyperlink; then follow “Arctic Portal” hyperlink; then in the top left search box,
type and search the name “Chukchi”).
23. See id.
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U.S. territorial waters.
Relevant to this, through the Division of Homeland
Security’s (DHS) vast range of agencies focused on ensuring
domestic security, is the National Response Framework
(NRF).24 Under NRF, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) sets out five overview areas (prevention,
protection, mitigation, response, and recovery)25 under three
key theme areas (engaged partnerships, scalability, flexibility,
adaptability in implementation, and integration among the
frameworks).26 Emphasizing the need to focus on these and
other aspects of decentralized, community-based observing,
preparedness and response, is the recent decision by Shell Oil
Corporation and other oil and gas entities to indefinitely
suspend operations in the Arctic.27 Since these organizations
historically provided much of the critical response support in
remote regions we must now address an alternate set of
models to ensure safety and security in America’s Arctic.
Toward this end, this article focuses on “engaged
partnerships” in the context of the NRF’s overview areas; and
establishes a means to improve our awareness of activities,
conditions, and trends as well as to increase the collection of
scientific knowledge and the use of traditional knowledge as
set forth in the NSAR.28 Engaged partnerships can be
considered to be working relationships that are sustained by
regular communication and active support between response
agency leaders and local-level organizations and individuals.
This article also proposes that policies formalizing the
incorporation of community based observing networks
(CBONS) and the establishment of an integrated response
framework (IRF) focusing on the maritime domain will
24. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK (2013),
http://www.fema.gov/national-response-framework [hereinafter NATIONAL RESPONSE
FRAMEWORK].
25. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS SYSTEM,
http://www.fema.gov/mission-areas (last updated Oct. 2, 2015).
26. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK (NRF) –
FACT SHEET, www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/NRFOnePageFactSheet.pdf (last
visited Oct. 2, 2015).
27. See generally A. Hardee, Taking Stock of Oil Drilling’s Wildlife Impact: Center
for Biological Diversity v. Salazar, 40 Ecology L.Q. 541 (2013); J.D. Unger, Regulating
the Arctic Gold Rush: Recommended Regulatory Reforms to Protect Alaska’s Arctic
Environment form Offshore Oil Drilling Pollution, 31 Alaska L. Rev. 263 (2014).
28. See NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC REGION, supra note 1.
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accomplish many of the goals of both the NSAR and the NRF.29
Use of such a system will enhance observation networks and
preparedness, as well as response entities and actions. These
elements will come together to create a whole that respects the
enormous diversity in the Arctic and acknowledges that a
shared arctic geography requires a different approach, and
policies, to collective response. A comprehensive framework
requires the use of a socio-environmental and technological
systems-based approach focusing on key indicators with
simple, robust and accessible models for interactions that
allow us to forecast Arctic Critical Events (ACE) in the form of
a regional, community-centered, early-warning system.30 In
this context we define ACE as any biological, infrastructure,
maritime shipping, or other natural or social event that is
detrimental to society or the environment and necessitates a
timely response in order to ameliorate deleterious effects
caused by the event.
Community Based Observing Networks and Systems
(CBONS) are used to observe Arctic events and changes and to
record scientific evidence.31 Broader observing networks are
used to prepare for ACE, and an IRF facilitates cooperative,
time-critical, and successful responses to a range of those
events.32 In addition, an IRF requires federal and state
agencies to develop a plan that equips remote communities to
assist in response-on-the-ground for a range of ACE. Historical
precedent exists for a network of skilled observers and on-theground responders in remote areas who are able to put these
29. Id.; NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, supra note 24.
30. See generally Francois Fouinat, A Comprehensive Framework for Human
Security, 4 CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEV. 289 (2004); Noriko Fujita Fukita et al., A
Comprehensive Framework for Human Resources for Health System Development in
Fragile
and
Post-Conflict
States,
8
PLOS
MED.
1
(2011),
http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001146;
U.N.
DEV. PROG., JOINT COMMUNITY-CENTERED SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME,
GOVERNMENT OF COOK ISLANDS, NIUE, SAMOA AND TOKELAU/ UN JOINT COMMUNITYCENTERED
SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMME,
http://www.ws.undp.org/content/dam/samoa/docs/prodocs/UNDP_WS_CCSDP_ProDoc.
pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2016) (examples of comprehensive frameworks using both
socio-environmental and technological systems-based approaches).
31. See Lilian Alessa et al., The Role of Indigenous Science and Local Knowledge in
Integrated Observing Systems: Moving Toward Adaptive Capacity Indices and Early
Warning Systems, 11 SUSTAINABILITY SCI. 91, 92 (2016).
32. See Christian Huggel et al., Early Warning Systems: The “Last Mile” of
Adaptation, 93 EOS 209, 210 (2012).
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data into situational context: the Alaska Territorial Guard
(ATG).33 During World War II, the ATG was commissioned to
alert the U.S. to enemy activities in the seas and skies of
Alaska.34 All in all, the ATG operated as a system of observers,
first responders, defenders, and people to stock caches along
flight corridors and coastal routes.35 The hazards faced in
World War II are similar to some of the challenges faced today
by responding agencies such as the United States Coast Guard
(USCG), particularly in the Bering and Chukchi Seas regions.
Alaska was considered too remote and vast to outfit with the
needed level of equipment and too distant from the contiguous
U.S. to be of relevance and to effectively protect, an echo of
similar challenges faced today.36 General Malin Craig, U.S.
Army Chief of Staff, said in November 1937, “. . . the mainland
of Alaska is so remote from the strategic areas of the Pacific
that it is difficult to conceive of circumstances in which air
operations therefrom would contribute materially to the
national defense.”37
In the context of this article, we will specifically advance
arguments for inclusion of CBONS in the NRF, the USCG
Concept of Operations (CONOPS),38 and the Arctic Strategic
Plan,39 in order to create a system to forecast ACE, prepare for
their actuality, and mount a rapid response. Such a framework
could better enable local and regional responses around an
“Observe-Prepare-Respond” paradigm (Figure 1). We define
observing
as
quality-assured
and
quality-controlled
documentation of social, physical, and biological data that
provides a baseline for detecting changing patterns and
subsequently preparation and response. Preparedness is
defined as the use of observing system outputs to derive
awareness of potential critical events and the forecasting of
33. Ernest Gruening, Introduction to MUKTUK MARSTON, MEN OF THE TUNDRA:
ESKIMOS AT WAR 1 (1969).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2, 3.
37. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
38. U.S. COAST GUARD, NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK: CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
(CONOP) (2007),
http://www.nrt.org/production/NRT/RRTHome.nsf/Resources/RRTDocument1/$FILE/N
RF_USCG_CONOP.PDF.
39. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC REGION, supra note 1.
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their emergence, leading to a rapid, yet organized, response.
Observing and preparation are consequently the foundations
for response, which we describe as any systematic and
proactive set of actions to address critical events. The United
States assumed the chairmanship of the Arctic Council on
April 24, 2015 and will retain the chair until 2017.40 The
opportunity to create such a blueprint toward arctic national
preparedness, response, and resilience, hereafter referred to as
the Integrated Response Framework (IRF), will challenge the
United States and its interests in the Arctic region for the
remainder of the United States’ chairmanship. The
consequences of failing to produce such a blueprint, while the
United States is chair, may tarnish its legacy.
II.

WHY A SYSTEMS-BASED APPROACH?

A key challenge for the science of scholarly inquiry and
actions responding to changing environments in Alaska is that
there are multiple disciplinary effects that remain
disconnected. In addition, despite an urgent need to respond,
the key variables, mechanisms, and processes that can
maximize adaptive capacity and response on the ground by
human communities are neither well-understood nor
effectively operationalized.41 The tangible consequence of these
challenges is that our organization for successful response at
multiple spatial scales remains poor.
The themes of anticipating threats and translating that
knowledge into adaptive capacity are pillars of President
Obama’s NSAR42 and his Executive Order on Preparedness
and Resilience.43 Key goals of the strategy and the executive
order include fostering national awareness of the Arctic,
bolstering maritime regimes, enhancing public-private
relationships through a national concept of operations,
identifying necessary authorities, and recognizing future

40. Arctic, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/arc/ (last visited
Mar. 5, 2016).
41. See Nathan L. Engle, Adaptive Capacity and its Assessment, 21 GLOBAL ENVTL.
CHANGE 647 (2011); Jochen Hinkel, “Indicators of Vulnerability and Adaptive
Capacity”: Towards a Clarification of the Science-Policy Interface, 21 GLOBAL ENVTL.
CHANGE 198 (2011).
42. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC REGION, supra note 1.
43. Exec. Order No. 13653, 70 Fed. Reg. 66819 (Nov. 6, 2013).
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requirements and resources that lend themselves to success.44
The Arctic strategy and executive order also encourage
advances in science and technology intended to facilitate
successful response in the region.45 In addition, the UN HFA
priorities emphasize that there remains a need to develop
quantitative indices for “adaptive capacity” that aggregates
diverse information across time, affected systems and regions,
and impact metrics.46 Toward this we propose a systems-based
approach that consists of: (1) using CBONS to place
observations in a situational context; (2) developing a
community-centered early warning system capable of
forecasting ACE; and (3) developing new policies and an IRF
for partnering with local communities to both train and equip
them to be first responders in conjunction with regional, state
and federal response agencies as anticipated in the NRF.47
When considering a framework or blueprint for responding
to change, it is necessary to incorporate three components: (1)
social components, including policies, laws and governance; (2)
biogeophysical components, including the inherent types and
rates of change in ecosystems; and (3) technological
components, including the range of technologies that are both
driving socio-environmental change, and the availability to
respond to them.48 In order to do this, there must be
systematic observations of change, placement of these
observations of change in both a situational and anticipatory
context for ACE, and then targeting preparedness such that
response actions can occur quickly with the best likelihood of
success (IRF).

44. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC REGION, supra note 1, at 6.
45. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC REGION, supra note 1; Exec. Order No.
13653, supra note 43.
46. See generally HANS-MARTIN FÜSSEL, REVIEW AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF
INDICES OF CLIMATE CHANGE EXPOSURE, ADAPTIVE CAPACITY, SENSITIVITY, AND
IMPACTS 8, 8–8 (2009); Rosina M. Bierbaum & Marianne Fey, World Development
Report 2010: Development and Climate Change, 1 WORLD DEV. REP. 53077 (2009),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2010/01/11831971/world-developmentreport-2010-development-climate-change.
47. NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, supra note 24.
48. Lilian Alessa et al., BEST PRACTICES FOR INTEGRATING SOCIAL SCIENCES INTO
SOCIAL ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS SCIENCE: FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR BUILDING A MORE
RESILIENT AMERICA 2 (2015).
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Figure 1. The need to adopt a systems-based

approach to develop both ACE and the IRF. CBONS
allow observations to be placed in a situational
context. The vast array of arctic natural and social
sciences can provide input to the forecasting system
(ACE), and an integrated response framework (IRF)
allows targeted preparedness, training and
equipment to be mobilized in partnership with
responding agencies.
Using Community Based Observing Networks to Better
Enable Local Responses to Arctic Critical Events.
Expansion of the federal government policies of outreach
and inclusion of indigenous communities in decision-making
will benefit the United States in accomplishing its goals of
protecting the Arctic environment and conserving its
resources, establishing an integrated arctic management
framework, and employing scientific research and traditional
knowledge to increase understanding of the Arctic.49 This can
be accomplished through CBONS, which use a set of human
observers to provide comprehensive data, through observations
of a range of environmental variables and events.
Partnering with Indigenous communities to inform policy is
not new in the United States. The Marine Mammal Protection
Act of 1972 permits traditional harvest and involvement of
Alaskan Native organizations and the Alaska Nanuuq
49. See NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC REGION, supra note 1.
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Commission in the management system.50 Federal agencies,
including the National Marine Fisheries Service, the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service,
and the United States Environmental Protection Agency, are
required by regulation to consult with tribal entities.51 The
National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA),52 and the
State Transportation Improvement Program (STIP),53 also
require outreach and consultation. CBONS are a logical
extension of these regulatory requirements.
The human observers who comprise CBONS systematically
input observations and collaborate to create a knowledge
network that constructs broader, regional-scale changes and
dynamics from discrete sets of quality-controlled information.54
The majority of these observers are indigenous peoples whose
intimacy with their landscapes and waterscapes is high.55
Observers can describe changes accurately and place them in
an appropriate social context.56 Each observer is akin to a
sensor and, linked together, they form a robust and adaptive
sensor array that constitutes CBONS. CBONS are able to
monitor changing ecological conditions (e.g., weather, sea
state, sea ice, flora, and fauna)57 as well as anthropogenic

50. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1423(c), 1388 (2012).
51. 18 C.F.R. § 16.8 (2015).
52. National Environmental Policy Act. 49 U.S.C. 5304(g) (2012); National
Environmental Policy, 42 U.S.C. §§4321–4370(h) (2011)
53. State Transportation Improvement, 25 C.F.R. § 170.106 (2015).
54. See Lilian Alessa et al., supra note 31; Sarah Roop et al., “We Didn’t Cross the
Border; The Border Crossed Us: Informal Social Adaptations to Formal Governance
and Policies by Communities Across the Bering Sea Region in the Russian Far East
and United States, 5 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 69 (2015).
55. See Fikret Berkes & Mina Kislalioglu Berkes, Ecological Complexity, Fuzzy
Logic, and Holism in Indigenous Knowledge, 41 FUTURES 6 (2009); Sandra Grant &
Fikret Berkes, Fisher Knowledge as Expert System: A Case from the Longline Fishery
of Grenada, the Eastern Caribbean, 84 FISHERIES RES. 162 (2007).
56. See Eddy Carmack & Robie MacDonald, Water and Ice-Related Phenomena in the
Coastal Region of the Beaufort Sea: Some Parallels Between Native Experience and
Western Science, 61 ARCTIC 265 (2008); Andy Mahoney et al., Sea-Ice Thickness
Measurements from a Community-Based Observing Network, 90 BULLETIN OF THE
AMERICAN. METEOROLOGICAL SOC. 370 (2009).
57. See Lilian Alessa, supra note 31; Peter Collings, Economic Strategies,
Community and Food Networks in Ulukhaktok, Northwest Territories, Canada, 64
ARCTIC 207 (2011); James D. Ford & Tristan Pearce, Climate Change Vulnerability
and Adaptation Research Focusing on the Inuit Subsistence Sector in Canada:
Directions for Future Research, 56 CAN. GEO. 275 (2012); Dyanna Riedlinger,
Responding to Climate Change in Northern Communities: Impacts and Adaptations 54
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activities (e.g., ship traffic, human behaviors, and changing
infrastructure).58
An example of a longstanding, quality-assured, and effective
CBONS is the Community-based Observation Network for
Adaptation and Security (CONAS).59 CONAS is the evolution
of the Bering Sea Sub-Network that was developed in 2007 in
partnership with university scientists at University of Alaska
Anchorage, arctic indigenous communities, and an NGO–the
Aleut International Association, a permanent participant of
the Arctic Council.60 CONAS utilizes distributed human
observers as sensors across the Bering Sea in both Alaska and
the Russian Federation to systematically observe and
document artic environmental and globalization changes
through co-developed surveys and questionnaires.61 In
CONAS, over forty factors of environmental and globalization
changes are observed within a socioeconomic context, and all
observations are quality assured and controlled, meaning they
are verified and validated.62 Changes monitored at the local
level hold higher significance in terms of understanding the
social processes that relate to biodiversity and the
vulnerabilities inherent in a changing environment.63 These
observations based on bottom-up realities are increasing
communities’ abilities to plan, adapt and respond to a
changing Arctic to ensure a secure and sustainable future.
Just like an instrumented array, CBONS can be tested and
calibrated. However, unlike fixed instruments, they consist of
intelligent actors who are much more capable of parsing

ARCTIC 96 (2001); Martin Tremblay, et al., Climate Change in North Quebec:
Adaptation Strategies from Community-Based Research, 61 ARCTIC 27 (2007).
58. See LILIAN ALESSA ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR COMMUNITY-BASED OBSERVING:
A
NATIONAL
WORKSHOP
REPORT
(2015),
https://www.arcus.org/files/newsitems/files/cbonreport_03-06-16_final.pdf.
59. See LILIAN ALESSA ET AL., CONSERVATION OF ARCTIC FLORA AND FAUNA
MONITORING SERIES REPORT NO.2, BERING SEA SUB-NETWORK II: SHARING
KNOWLEDGE, IMPROVING UNDERSTANDING, ENABLING RESPONSE – INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL OBSERVATION ALLIANCE FOR A CHANGING ARCTIC
(2011).
60. See VICTORIA GOFMAN ET AL., CONSERVATION OF ARCTIC FLORA AND FAUNA
MONITORING SERIES, BERING SEA SUB-NETWORK: PILOT PHASE FINAL REPORT 2009
(2015).
61. See Lilian Alessa et al., supra note 61.
62. See Lilian Alessa et al., supra note 31, at 6.
63. Id.
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information to better detect patterns (i.e., local knowledge for
global understanding). Indeed, one of the most urgent needs
that can be served by CBONS as part of the suite of integrated
observatories is to support efficient and effective adaptation to
environmental change. In order to better address the
environmental questions put forward by society, observations
that are placed in a clear set of social contexts must be better
integrated into our current observatory models.64 As part of the
White House’s string of recent press releases related to the
Arctic, CBONS were a priority area for development within the
U.S. Arctic Chairmanship as well as more broadly in the
context of adaptation.65 In September 2015, the National
Science Foundation’s Advisory Committee for Environmental
Research and Education released its “Gold Report” in which
CBONS are called out as a necessary mechanism to ensure
effective response to a range of socio-environmental change:
“There is enormous opportunity to leverage current observing
networks to provide relevant data for adaptation actions at
increasingly finer temporal and spatial scales, for example,
through investments in community-based observing networks
that harness place-based, local, and traditional knowledge.”66
U.S. federal agencies have invested billions of dollars to
support observation systems including those in the Arctic;
state, local, and private-sector entities also have established
significant observing capacities.67 Many of the existing
observing systems provide significant value and are meeting
needs relevant to specific agencies.68 However, because these
systems were established under disciplinary and agency

64. See James D. Ford & Tristan Pearce, supra note 57, at 277.
65. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: President Obama Announces
New Investments to Enhance Safety and Security in the Changing Arctic (Sept. 1,
2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/01/fact-sheet-presidentobama-announces-new-investments-enhance-safety-and.
66. See NAT’L SCIENCE FOUNDATION ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR ENVTL. RESEARCH &
EDUCATION, AMERICA’S FUTURE: ENVTL. RESEARCH AND EDUCATION FOR A THRIVING
CENTURY 24 (2015).
67. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ABRUPT IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE:
ANTICIPATING SURPRISES (2013); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., NOAA’S OBSERVING
SYSTEMS: ADDITIONAL STEPS NEEDED TO ACHIEVE AN INTEGRATED, COST-EFFECTIVE,
PORTFOLIO 13 (2014).
68. See COMM. ON DESIGNING AN ARCTIC OBSERVING NETWORK, POLAR RESEARCH
BOARD, DIV. OF EARTH AND LIFE SCIENCE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOWARD AN
INTEGRATED ARCTIC OBSERVING NETWORK (2007).
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boundaries and continue to operate independently, the current
overall suite of observation systems may not optimally address
the NSAR and NRF goals.69 We know that there are critical
redundancies and/or gaps, and an uneven level of integration
and interoperability among observatories, which hampers our
ability to use the data for preparing and responding to arctic
change.70 These challenges fall within the DHS’s purview.71 In
2008 DHS reorganized to include twenty-three agencies under
its umbrella, including the USCG.72 Each of these agencies has
established extensive and well thought out scopes, mandates,
and missions.73 Though DHS continues to experience
challenges from the monumental tasks of coordinating and
communicating with diverse agencies, it has established a
network of Centers of Excellence (CoE) that unite diverse and
nationally recognized experts as partners around a common
issue.74 One such CoE, the Arctic Domain Awareness Center
(ADAC), came into being in 2014.75 Its mission is to provide a
real-time coordinated system for maritime monitoring in the
Arctic, with the USCG as its primary client.76 It includes
CBONS as part of its research, education, and outreach
portfolio.77

69. Id. at 25.
70. Id. at 11.
71. See generally Scott Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security
Implications of Global Warming, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 63 (2008); FRANKLIN GRIFFITHS, ET
AL., ARCTIC SECURITY IN AN AGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 244–60 (James Kraska ed.,
2011).
72. See CATHERINE DALE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34455, ORGANIZING THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY: OVERVIEW OF THE INTERAGENCY REFORM
DEBATES (2008); HAROLD RELYEA & HENRY HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33042,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY REORGANIZATION: THE 2SR INITIATIVE (2005).
73. RELYEA & HOGUE, supra note 72, at 8.
74. See Louise Comfort, Crisis Management in Hindsight: Cognition,
Communication, Coordination, and Control, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 189–93, (2007);
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY CENTERS OF
EXCELLENCE (COE), http://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/centers-excellence
(last visited April 4, 2016).
75. ARCTIC DOMAIN AWARENESS CENTER,
http://www. arcticdomainawarenesscenter.org (last visited April 4, 2016).
76. Id.
77. Id.
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III. FORECASTING ARCTIC CRITICAL EVENTS: WHAT IS
A REGIONAL EARLY WARNING SYSTEM?
The 2013 National Research Council report Abrupt Impacts
of Climate Change: Anticipating Surprises identified one
overriding need: early warning systems (EWS) that would be
essential for anticipating, warning, and planning for future
abrupt changes.78 The report, however, stopped short of
describing in detail how to establish an early warning system,
citing the need for additional expertise to adequately tackle
this task.79
The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster
Reduction (UNISDR) defines an EWS as: “[t]he set of
capacities needed to generate and disseminate timely and
meaningful warning information to enable individuals,
communities and organizations threatened by a hazard to
prepare and to act appropriately and in sufficient time to
reduce the possibility of harm or loss.”80 The UN further
qualifies that definition as follows: “[t]his definition
encompasses the range of factors necessary to achieve effective
responses to warnings. A people-centered early warning
system necessarily comprises four key elements: knowledge of
the risks; monitoring, analysis and forecasting of the hazards;
communication or dissemination of alerts and warnings; and
local capabilities to respond to the warnings received.”81
This annotated definition includes the range of factors
necessary to integrate both a coupled socio-environmental and
technological system (SETS) for effective response. Early
warning systems exist for natural geophysical and biological
hazards, complex socio-political emergencies, industrial
hazards, personal health risks, and many other related
hazards,82 but few EWS exist that account for the real-world
78. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 67, at 147.
79. Id. at 164.
80. U. N. INT’L STRATEGY FOR DISASTER REDUCTION, 2009 UNISDR TERMINOLOGY ON
DISASTER REDUCTION 12 (2009),
http://www.unisdr.org/files/7817_UNISDRTerminologyEnglish.pdf.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Christian Huggel, et al., Is Climate Change Responsible for Changing
Landslide Activity in High Mountains? 37 EARTH SURF. PROCESS LANDFORMS 77 (2012)
(discussing early warning systems from a geophysical perspective); Lilian Alessa, et
al., supra note 31 (discussing early warning systems from a subsistence fishing and
hunting perspective).
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integration of social, ecological and technological systems so as
to increase the effectiveness of on-the-ground responses by
communities.83 Effective regional integrated EWS are codeveloped by diverse end-users such that the benefits are fully
recognized. This requires both that trust be established and
that the community or region must accept responsibility for its
own future. The incorporation of local and place-based
knowledge, through CBONS, in cataloging early warning signs
will increase community-level response, responsibility and
action.84
In order to be economically feasible, a community-focused
EWS should be considered. Such a system necessarily
comprises four key elements: (1) knowledge of the risks; (2)
monitoring, analysis and forecasting of the hazards; (3)
communication or dissemination of alerts and warnings; and
(4) local or regional capacities to respond to the warnings
received including training, equipment, and coordination.85
The expression “end-to-end warning system” emphasizes
that early warning systems need to span all steps from
detection of critical changes to community response.86 Reliable
early warning systems developed globally have been
instrumental in saving lives and protecting assets and
livelihoods.87 However, they have not yet been implemented in
the U.S. as an integrated process for the purpose of
anticipating both acute and chronic (threshold) changes that
require intervention, specific preparedness, or adaptation
through targeted responses.
An essential first step is to develop a shared vision of the
desired early warning system, with buy-in and incorporation of
local and regional knowledge and capacity. Concerted
connection with communities on the ground allows for the coprioritization of needs for preparedness and early warning and
recovery. Incorporation of local and place-based, including
83. See Lilian Alessa et al., supra note 31.
84. Id.; KIRSTY GALLOWAY MCLEAN, ADVANCE GUARD: CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS,
ADAPTATION, MITIGATION AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES – A COMPENDIUM OF CASE
STUDIES (2009),
http://www.unutki.org/downloads/File/Publications/UNU_2009_Advance_Reading_Cop
y_Advance_Guard_Compendium.pdf.
85. See Lilian Alessa et al., supra note 31, at 10.
86. See, U. N. INT’L STRATEGY FOR DISASTER REDUCTION, supra note 80.
87. See Huggel et al., supra note 32.
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indigenous, knowledge can enhance regional EWS.88
Forecasting Arctic Critical Events: An Arctic
Early Warning System.
Having articulated a system that establishes an effective
means for observation of Arctic critical events, we move to
establishing a means for response through preparation. We
assert that there are two profound failures in overall policy
governing arctic preparedness and response: siloing across
agencies and an over-reliance on top-down data inputs. These
vulnerabilities are artifacts of a time when there was the need
for different agencies to specialize in key areas. For example,
within the USCG, preparedness and response plans for oil
spills are separate from the mission area for search and
rescue.89 Moreover, other agencies such as the Alaska Division
of Homeland Security & Emergency Management,90 Alaska
National Guard and the Alaska State Defense Force,91 and
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC),92
as well as a range of private corporations’ incident response
units, each operate under separate scopes and mandates. The
State of Alaska has its own Emergency Operations Plan,93 as
does the DEC94 and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.95 There
are so many emergency response, operations, and incident
88. See U.N. OFFICE FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION, SENDAI FRAMEWORK FOR
DISASTER RISK REDUCTION 2015–2030 23 (2015),
http://www.unisdr.org/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf.
89. See MERV FINGAS, THE BASICS OF OIL SPILL CLEANUP 19 (3d ed. 2012).
90. DIV. OF HOMELAND SECURITY & EMERGENCY MGMT., OUR MISSION, ALASKA
DEP’T OF MILITARY AND VETERANS AFF., https://www.ak-prepared.com (last visited
Mar. 4, 2016).
91. Alaska State Defense Force, ALASKA DEP’T OF MILITARY AND VETERANS AFF.,
http://dmva.alaska.gov/ASDF/ASDF_JOC (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
92. ALASKA DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, DISASTER RESPONSE PLAN:
DEPARTMENTAL PROCEDURES IN THE EVENT OF A NATURAL OR MAN-MADE DISASTER
https://dec.alaska.gov/spar/ppr/plans/adec_disaster.pdf.
93. STATE OF ALASKA, DIV. OF HOMELAND SECURITY & EMERGENCY MGMT., THE
STATE OF ALASKA 2011 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN,
http://www.poa.usace.army.mil/Portals/34/docs/AKdistrict/StateofAlaskaEmergencyOp
erationsPlan2011.pdf.
94. See DISASTER RESPONSE PLAN, supra note 92.
95. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN (2011),
http://www.poa.usace.army.mil/Portals/34/docs/AKdistrict/StateofAlaskaEmergencyOp
erationsPlan2011.pdf.
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plans for Alaska that it is difficult to differentiate
responsibilities, overlaps, leverage points, and gaps. The
agency with primary responsibility for maritime response in
the Arctic is the U.S. Coast Guard.96
There is a great deal of uncertainty around the rates and
types of geopolitical and environmental changes that may
drive the need for a response and hence, the risks that may
emerge in the near to midterm future.97 Risk and uncertainty
in Alaska are heightened because of the lack of infrastructure,
including roads, and a marine geophysical environment setting
with extremes of ice and darkness. Given the reductions in
funding to the U.S. Coast Guard,98 it is unrealistic to expect
the agency to cover all contingencies across a marine area with
a combined total greater than that of the continental United
States.
We assert that “preparedness and response” will be more
effectively implemented through CBONS. These networks can
help coordinate responses of the numerous agencies listed
above by placing communities at the forefront of observation
(since they are strategically geographically located) and
anticipation of threats or events, and by training community
members as first responders. CBONS will concomitantly
increase the capacity of the USCG and, in essence, increase its
labor force. However, preparedness and response will require
efforts beyond incorporating CBONS. Those efforts will include
developing a forecasting system for ACE, which could be
accomplished through the DHS ADAC.
Developing a forecasting system for ACE can leverage past
investments in characterizing the Earth system,99 improve our
ability to detect and attribute global and environmental
change, inform climate models capable of simulating long-term
96. U.S.
COAST
GUARD,
COAST
GUARD
ARCTIC
STRATEGY
(2013),
http://www.uscg.mil/seniorleadership/docs/cg_arctic_strategy.pdf
97. See DALE ET AL., supra note 72; RELYEA & HOGUE, supra note 72.
98. See U.S. COAST GUARD, ALWAYS READY: 2013 PERFORMANCE HIGHLIGHTS & 2015
BUDGET IN BRIEF (2015), http://www.uscg.mil/budget/docs/2015_Budget_in_Brief.pdf.
99. The term “Earth system” refers to the interactions of the Earth’s physical,
chemical, and biological processes, including the land, oceans, atmosphere, and poles.
It includes the planet’s natural cycles—carbon, water, nitrogen, phosphorus, sulfur
and other cycles—and deep Earth processes. See Earth System Definitions, GLOBAL
CHANGE,
http://www.igbp.net/globalchange/earthsystemdefinitions.4.d8b4c3c12bf3be638a80001
040.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
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climate change, and improve research related to
environmental health, northern subsistence, natural and manmade disasters, fresh water, and other critical societallyrelevant areas. It could also provide a means to identify
priorities for repurposing existing observing systems, ranging
from satellite-based remote sensing to CBONS, and/or make
new investments. Key to developing this is a more concerted
connection with the users of environmental change
information, that is, a community-centered early warning
system, so as to be able to respond effectively to their needs
and partner with them for response operations on the ground.
It will be important to connect information on emerging
thresholds of change with improved preparedness ranging
from equipment to training to planning and response.
An ACE forecasting system can be established by first
identifying a list of indicators and sub-indices necessary for
integration into an Arctic EWS as defined by UNDISR.100 In
Table 1, we propose a set of initial indicators that were
selected based on: (1) primary, peer reviewed literature,101 (2)
agency defined and identified parameters used in operations;
and (3) the Delphi method.102
Table 1.
Type of Sensor

Indicator

Sub-Indices

Sea ice

Extent, velocity,
quality, pattern

Marine debris

Bulk, diffuse, rigid,
unknown

Roads, buildings, & ports
Remote Sensing

Shipping patterns (AIS
visible)

Baseline, irregular,
proximity to habitat

Phytoplankton and
marine algae

Variation from baseline,
pattern, density, types

Oil / petrochemicals

Location at unfamiliar
places, density

100. See U.N. INT’L STRATEGY FOR DISASTER REDUCTION, supra note 80, at 12.
101. Alistair Smith et al., Remote Sensing the Vulnerability of Vegetation in Natural
Terrestrial Ecosystems, 154 REMOTE SENSING OF ENVTL. 332 (2014).
102. HAROLD A. LINSTONE & MURRAY TUROFF, THE DELPHI METHOD: TECHNIQUES
AND APPLICATIONS 10–12 (2002).
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Wetland drying / surface

Rates

drying
Greening / browning

Rates, types of

(NDVI)

vegetation, proximity to
habitat, cause

Phenology

Increased uncoupling

Ocean temperature

Higher, lower,
phenologically disjunct

Coastlines

Erosion (rates &
patterns), proximity to
habitat, proximity to
infrastructure,
sedimentation

Ocean temperature

Higher, lower,
phenologically disjunct

Salinity

Higher, lower, pattern

Microbes

TBD

Oil / petrochemicals

Location at unfamiliar
places, density, proxy
indicators through

Buoy /
Meteorological
Station

oiling of wildlife.
Precipitation / hydrology

Increase, decrease, rate
(e.g., drought/flood),
proximity to
infrastructure

Phenology

Increased uncoupling

Species distributions /

TBD

biodiversity
Marine transit patterns

Increased occurrence

(AIS – dark/unfamiliar)
Fauna - familiar

Frequency, body
condition (e.g., lesions),
behaviors

Community-based
Observing
Networks

Fauna – unfamiliar

Occurrence,
distribution

Flora – familiar

Frequency, productivity
(e.g., berries, rhizomes,
roots), condition

Flora –unfamiliar

Occurrence,
distribution

Phenology

Increased uncoupling
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TBD

Human consequencesanticipated
Coastlines

Erosion (rates &
patterns), proximity to
habitat, proximity to
infrastructure,
sedimentation

Additional steps to operationalize ACE include:
Design Based on Current Theory: ACE will need to be
able to detect critical shifts soon enough to intervene. In order
to accomplish this, indicators (Table 1) will help guide
observations. These indicators are variables for which there
are: (1) easily accessible and reliable observations ranging
from remote sensing to CBONS; (2) models capable of
integrating these data streams; and (3) outputs on which
decisions can be made. Clusters of weighted indicators will
constitute warning suites.
Identify Indicators and Indicator Clusters: Indicators
are derived from currently observed variables for which we can
regularly acquire data in near- or real-time. Gaps that are
identified in critical indicators will help guide adjustments to
existing observing networks and instruments. Weighting will
occur through the Delphi Method, using expert input to
construct clusters (weighted indicators that are integrated
around an Incidents of National Significance (IONS)).103
Identify Warning Suites: This involves mapping priorities
outlined by Pacific Command, Northern Command, the U.S.
Coast Guard and the Office of Naval Research to develop
indicator clusters and creating attention categories: e.g.,
watch, adjust, respond.104 These categories specify what we are
warning about and who is being warned.

103. Incidents of National Significance, as defined in the NRF, are high impact
events that require an extensive and well-coordinated multi-agency response to save
lives, minimize damage, and provide the basis for long-term community and economic
recovery. See NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NRP_Brochure.pdf.
104. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-566, ARCTIC PLANNING: DOD
EXPECTS TO PLAY A SUPPORTING ROLE TO OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES AND HAS EFFORTS
UNDER WAY TO ADDRESS CAPABILITY NEEDS AND UPDATE PLANS (2015),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/670903.pdf.
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Develop Scenarios: Scenarios based on ACE integration
models can help better guide preparedness and response by
constructing scenarios of arctic critical events (also see IONS
below) that have meaning to communities on the ground.
Build Capacity: ACE can guide building preparedness and
response capacity among different end users including
management agencies, industries, tribal bodies, NGOs, and
resident communities not only through scenario-building but
also by changing culture. Currently, there is a great deal of
willingness and desire on behalf of remote communities in the
Arctic to be active participants at time zero of a critical event,
such as a ship adrift spilling hazardous cargo (potentially
requiring not only containment and neutralization but also
rescue and housing of survivors and/or recovery of fatalities),
because these residents could be severely impacted by the
expected delays in a more centralized response.105
ACE and Incidents of National Significance (IONS).
IONS are high-impact events that require an extensive and
well-coordinated multiagency response to save lives, minimize
damage, and provide the basis for long-term community and
economic recovery.106 However, the realities of response mean
that success is variable and dependent on several assumptions
and pre-conditions that may not be met. For example, one
assumption is that the responding agency is capable of a
timely mobilization which has not been compromised such that
response-efficacy is reduced. Ideally, emergent responses can
help off-set the burden of centralized response but a precondition is that a degree of appropriate preparedness must be
in place. In order to accomplish this, regional EWS that are
heavily integrated need to be developed against IONS. Our
primary concerns with IONS arise from both anthropogenic
and naturally-derived events. Examples are as follows:
1. Convergent environmental variables of changing sea
ice, coastal erosion and increased ship transits puts
coastal communities at risk for not only overt
dislocation but also chronic problems associated

105. See EPPR: Emergency Prevention and Preparedness Plan, ARCTIC COUNCIL,
http://arctic-council.org/eppr/completed-work/oil-and-gas-products/arctic-guide/.
106. See NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, supra note 24.
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with rapid changes in food species.
2. Simultaneous malicious and purposeful interference
and/or destruction of critical infrastructure and
natural resources (e.g., cyber-jamming airport
facilities, setting forest fires, disrupting ports, etc.)
pre-dispose communities and national security to
harm and can critically tax resources of responding
agencies, compromising response.
National, regional and local entities possessing integrated
early warnings in the form of actionable and trusted
information and knowledge of threat precursors are in a much
stronger position to anticipate and prevent an incident or,
should one occur, greatly reduce its impact on the societies
they protect.
IV. TOWARD AN INTEGRATED RESPONSE
FRAMEWORK.
The logical framework for a response framework is the NRF.
The NRF emphasizes community engagement,107 which
specifically speaks to policies around: (1) planning, (2) public
information and warning; and (3) operational coordination.
This phrase seems to anticipate the incorporation of CBONS
into the NRF. Incorporating CBONS would enhance available
information by adding a range of data streams, as well as onthe-ground validation, to supplement existing data-streams,
reduce costs, raise awareness within communities who
participate in the observing network, and place observations
into a societal context, which would further enable the
accuracy of ACE. Additional values of CBONS lie in their use
in guiding targeted preparedness, planning, workforce, and
skills development. In the Arctic, where data streams are
particularly limited and we are often “blind” during certain
seasons, CBONS will be of particular utility. This model is
readily transferable to other parts of the United States.
As part of an IRF, not only should key observed/monitored
variables and indicators of change be identified, including
those obtained through CBONS, but these should also be
107. See R. Perkins & R. Bullock, Indigenous Communities Participation in
Environmental Decisions (2014),
http://www.academia.edu/9410444/Indigenous_Communities_Participation_in_Enviro
nmental_Decisions.
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mapped to the capabilities and resources most likely needed
during an incident, including describing the responsibilities of
primary and support agencies involved (Emergency Support
Function Annexes).108
Focusing on the relationships between determining the need
to respond and effectively doing so requires more concerted
connection with communities on the ground in the Arctic. This
also serves to build buy-in and trust within these communities,
mitigating the possibility of a compromised response plan that
could arise if a lack of trust is present.109 In establishing this
connection, communities are asked to prioritize needs (e.g.,
cultural and resource) so as to develop regional (e.g., statewide) indicators that can be used to develop a communitybased early warning system, leveraging the federal Climate
Resilience Toolkit (CRT),110 and the Arctic Adaptation
Exchange Portal (AAEP) in particular.111 These indicators can
be weighted and represented as a status dashboard (Figure 2).
Using the dashboard and algorithms for weighting variables
over space and time, a regional EWS (i.e., ACE) and an IRF
can be meaningfully used on the ground by non-specialized
users.
The information derived from observing networks,
particularly with those comprised of community observers,
forms the basis for continual monitoring of system changes. A
community-based early warning system is at the core of the
IRF. It is one that is co-developed, managed, and maintained
by regional response agencies in coordination with the
National Response Plan. It is based on a “people-centered”
approach that empowers individuals and communities
threatened by rapid and/or undesired changes to act in
sufficient time and in an appropriate manner to reduce the
possibility of injury, mortality, loss of well-being, damage to
valued ecosystems, and/or loss of livelihoods (economic

108. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN 2004,
FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, at ESF-i, http://fas.org/irp/agency/dhs/nrp.pdf.
109. See Ricardo Wray et al., Public Perceptions About Trust in Emergency Risk
Communication: Qualitative Research Findings, 24 INT. J. MASS EMERGENCIES AND
DISASTERS 45 (2006).
110. U.S. Climate Resilience Toolkit, NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
https://toolkit.climate.gov/ (last visited April 6, 2016).
111. Arctic Adaptation Exchange, ARCTIC COUNCIL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
WORKING GROUP, http://arcticadaptationexchange.com/ (last visited April 6, 2016).
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viability). It provides communities, practitioners, and
organizations involved in resource management with advance
information of risks that can be readily translated into
prevention, preparedness, and response actions.
Integrating CBONS into any preparedness and response
framework will require particular emphasis and focus on
quality assurances, verification, and validation. It should be
emphasized that, from a policy point of view, CBONS occupy a
unique niche in the “citizen science” spectrum. As anticipated
in this article and as utilized in Alaska, CBONS are not as
vulnerable to “spoofing” or to misleading or inaccurate data.112
Incorporating CBONS into preparedness and response
frameworks is necessary because it is unlikely that we, as a
nation, will be able to equip and mount a centralized set of
responses should arctic activity continue to increase at a
moderate rate. Thus, incorporating CBONS into ACE can: (1)
guide purposeful observations; (2) facilitate successful
responses by Alaskan communities; and (3) inform more costeffective planning and partnerships with local communities by
state and federal agencies. This can be accomplished by: (1)
helping manage data on observations of change; (2) integrating
these data into critical event scenarios which bear realistic
meaning to responding communities; and (3) combining
engagement, workforce development, and better connections
between communities and agencies. These elements enable
responses to occur more quickly and effectively.

Figure 2. The process of co-development of a
community-centered,
regional
early
warning
systems with end-user communities as potential
first responders.

112. Of particular concern are “observer blogs” which allow anyone to post
observations with little to no systematic data intake protocols. Such blogs are
particularly vulnerable to spoofing and purposeful addition of misleading information,
potentially introducing both a threat to security, as well as an inaccurate picture of
changing conditions and events. See Lilian Alessa et al., supra note 48.
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Thus, a regional, pilot IRF as a solution-generating system
includes the process and framework that lead to successful onthe-ground responses. Such a framework is illustrated in
Figure 2 above and involves:
1. An active stakeholder group that is part of a codesigned framework and co-developed solutions
(planners and responders).
2. Identification and assembly of best available data
(academic and agency scientists, local, and placespecific, community-based knowledge).
3. Data integration that acknowledges interoperability
across diverse data types which can allow more
realistic and accurate development of scenarios for
planning and training.
4. Suitable representation and visualization of SETS
dynamics (e.g. geovisualization).
5. Generation of a range of plausible future scenarios
and projection of possible outcomes using
geovisualization tools.
6. Development of potential responses to scenarios to
guide preparedness, co-develop and refine response
plans such as targeting what kinds of training and
equipment need to be provided.
V.

INCORPORATING CBONS IN THE NATIONAL
RESPONSE FRAMEWORK

Ultimately, we need to tackle the policies around
preparedness and response in the Arctic, a region that
presents
unusual
challenges
of
distance,
extreme
environments, and limited capacity to mount a centralized
response. Several questions that arise regarding our abilities
to develop a streamlined process of “observe-prepare-respond”
range from: Who are we warning? What are we warning about?
What is being threatened? What emerging opportunities might
there be, as the converse of what the risks are?
In this article, we have proposed a system capable of
forecasting Arctic Critical Events that can detect important
shifts soon enough to intervene from any one of a series of
distributed communities who may be impacted. Most of the
pieces currently exist and are functional but will require a
new, adaptive way of thinking by DHS and the State of Alaska,
as well as agencies such as the Department of Justice and

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol6/iss1/6

26

Alessa et al.: Incorporating Community-Based Observing Networks and Systems: Enh

2016]

INCORPORATING CBONS

27

Defense which can play important roles in support of the NRF,
thus enabling greater communication and operationalization
on the ground. This will require a careful examination of the
kinds of observations and integrated models necessary for
building response scenarios. The challenges of data, planning,
and response interoperability also need to be addressed so that
any outputs from a forecasting system for ACE can highly
accessible to communities on the ground, not just specialized
groups within universities or agencies.
By formally incorporating CBONS into the NRF, the
challenges of communicating warnings may be met halfway
because communities will have greater control of, and buy-in
to, information regarding emerging changes that could
potentially impact them, either positively or negatively.
Ultimately, a re-consideration of CBONS as part of a range of
observation, planning, and response frameworks will also
elevate the diversity and skills within remote communities in
Alaska. Increasing the human capacity to respond across such
a vast region could greatly assist responding agencies and
build improved trust between the public and government
resulting in a more resilient Arctic.
DISCLAIMER: The views and conclusions contained in this document are
those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily
representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security.
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